STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA)

IN CIRCUIT COURT

COUNTY OF LINCOLN

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT ****************

WE THE PEOPLE for FREE, FAIR, and TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

OTHER HEARING

VS.

SHERI LUND, LINCOLN COUNTY AUDITOR And LINCOLN COUNTY AUDITOR'S OFFICE, in and for LINCOLN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA,

Defendant.

41CIV.22-000463

BEFORE:

The Honorable John Pekas

Circuit Court Judge

Sioux Falls and Canton, South Dakota.

APPEARANCES: Mr. R. Shawn Tornow

Attorney at Law PO Box 90748

Sioux Falls, South Dakota

For the Plaintiff:

Mr. Joseph Meader Mr. William Golden Attorneys at Law

104 North Main Street Suite #200

Canton, South Dakota

For the Defendant.

PROCEEDINGS:

The above-entitled proceedings commenced at 8:00 a.m., on the 13th day of September, 2022, in Courtroom 6A, at the Minnehaha County Courthouse, Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

Roxane R. Osborn 605-782-3032 Sioux Falls, South Dakota

1 THE COURT: All right. Let's go ahead and go on the record, I do apologize, I have another hearing starting at 2 3 8:30. We don't have a lot of time this morning. This is 41CIV.22-463. It's, WE THE PEOPLE for FREE, FAIR and 4 5 TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS, LLC., versus the Lincoln County Auditors and Sheri Lund. And, ah, may I note appearances, please. MR. MEADER: Thank you, Joe Meader and Bill Golden on 9 behalf of Lincoln County. 10 MR. TORNOW: R. Shawn Tornow, Tornow Law Office on behalf 11 of the plaintiff. THE COURT: Thank you. And, ah, we're here, I believe on 12 the motion that was to go ahead and to vacate the order 13 14 entered last week, and, ah, Mr. Tornow, I did get up early 15 this morning, and I actually saw that there was a filing at about 4:30 in the morning. You must have been burning the 16 17 candle at both ends, but, ah, I don't even know if you had a chance to even review it, Mr. Golden or Mr. Meader. 18 19 MR. MEADER: I did. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And are you ready to 20 proceed then at this time, Mr. Tornow? 21 MR. TORNOW: 22 Yes. 23 THE COURT: All right. And are you ready to proceed at this time, Mr. Meader? 24

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MR. MEADER: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. So, please, proceed whenever you're ready. Mr. Tornow.

MR. TORNOW: Do you want me to go ahead on the initial order to vacate, or their, their motion, or the order, or their motion to vacate, how do you want to go forward?

THE COURT: I'll let you go ahead and do the motion to vacate, Mr. Meader.

MR. MEADER: Thank you, Judge. Um, it's Lincoln County's position that this order took the form of a preliminary injunction, as such there's several statutory requirements that need to take place for that order to come in to existence. The first is because there was no, um, joint motion by the parties or stipulation, that there should have been a motion by plaintiffs in this case to that effect.

There was no motion. And as such Lincoln County had no notice of the fact that this order was coming to be. In fact the counties had -- the county and the plaintiffs had not had any communication at all in regards to the case. The only communication came in the form of our auditor and our office being served papers that this case even existed.

It's Lincoln County's position that because we didn't have a stipulation there should have been a motion, and because we didn't have notice, we were not able to stipulate and, therefore, there should have been hearing on the matter for us to be able to appear in front of Your Honor to argue in

favor, or against, or to formulate some sort of language, ah, that would properly address the order overall. None of that happened here.

It's Lincoln County's understanding that this order came to be signed in an ex parte manner, and as our brief states, the only ex parte orders that I'm aware that come to exist are temporary protection orders or search warrants, um, and that's -- there's a reason for those orders being generally disfavored, Judge. Ah, parties need to be able to argue that merits of the order on their behalf in front of a judge and put it on the record.

Um, the other thing I'll state as an aside in this matter is that Mr. Tornow's brief mentions the fact that Lincoln County should have known that we waived such a right to be able to address this order on the merits by having stipulated in another case to preserve those records. That is not the case in front of Your Honor. That is a separate matter and that should not be considered for purposes of this order.

I would argue alternatively that Mr. Tornow's argument also fails for that reason because he, himself, being an attorney of record in that other case would have known that Lincoln County already stipulated to preserve those records and that this order would have become unnecessary. So, I don't believe the argument works either way.

As far as standing, um, I believe it's a pretty

elementary understanding that Lincoln County being one of the parties involved in the order has standing to argue the wording of the order itself. As such, I believe Lincoln County has the opportunity to speak that any named party would possibly have been able to be included in that order had the statutory requirements been met. They had not.

But then further that the order addressed parties that have not been named in this litigation or any other litigation for that matter. Um, and that was the reason that Lincoln County addressed the jurisdictional issue as far as what I would say these 65 other counties were involved.

Um, overall, Judge, to be frank, I was unsure of how to address the brief after Your Honor already signed the order to vacate, but I would generally say that I believed that that was proper considering the fact that there had been no motion, no hearing, and there had been no general discussion between the parties otherwise to stipulate to any sort of language in the order.

And, finally, Judge, I would just mention as far as the jurisdiction also goes that, um, the parties, I guess, the 65 other counties that were proposed were never served in this matter. They were only faxed this order after the fact and so as far as the procedural requirements go, I would just say that the 65 other counties also fail that statutory requirement that they were given notice and appeared before

Your Honor in such a manner.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MEADER: Unless, Your Honor, has any questions, I would rest.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Meader, and are you ready to proceed, Mr. Tornow?

MR. TORNOW: Yes, thank you. First of all, Judge, um, as we pointed out, and you did indicate, and I appreciate that, that we-we did file our responsive brief early this morning, and that's because for whatever reasons, and I'm not casting aspersions, um, but we were not served. I, I still haven't been served with their brief, um, as part of the motion to vacate that was only filed yesterday.

Um, I, I do understand it's within the Odyssey system. I can't explain why it's not there. We've submitted, and I think our Exhibit A shows we didn't have it, and I can tell you we still don't have it. I'm not saying they did anything wrong because I see that it, it is on file, but I point that out because I, I guess, and in addition to that, I would say that their brief really is untimely, and, and I'm not necessarily doing a tit-for-tat type argument, but when they claim, well, there was no notice. We have these issues with the, the order that was entered on September 1st, when, in fact, we have the stipulation, and, and I'll address that as part of the due process.

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I, I find it a little bit troubling that they filed their brief only the day before when it could have been filed last That having been said, I think our bigger and more important argument is that their concerns are really covered by principals of Res judicata, and I've cited -- they've cited no case authority for their due process argument, but I cited Farmer versus South Dakota Department of Revenue 2010 case South Dakota 35, that-that generally has some analogies, I believe, and, and the-the reason that there is res judicata here that, and they say, well, it's a separate action, of course it's a separate action. That's-that's what res judicata is about, but it does have the same parties. meets the criteria that there was a judgment on the merits given that the court did enter an order on August 26th. And we know, Judge, that this is a unique case because it's so time sensitive. It was very much time sensitive as to September 3rd, um, and, and the court entered its order that covers Lincoln County. We, we, we would submit in its entirety as per that order.

So, the fact that we have this parallel order that deals really with other counties, um, they-they haven't worked any due process to that because again they don't -- we would submit, and we've argued they don't have standing to make that argument for Brule County, Douglas County, Ziebach County. Those counties as was envisioned in the order that you signed

on September 1st, um, those counties can certainly appear and say, you know, to use an old adage from you know our child, our childhood years you know you're not the boss of me, you can't tell me what to do. That seems rather implausible when we're simply seeking transparency here, and open records that are public records versus the destruction of records. So, I, I don't know that that would even come about, and I would note that these other counties did receive a copy of the order, um, and again to whatever extent they may challenge that we, we would address that at the time. That hasn't happened.

So, we would submit again that that it meets the criteria of res judicata as to Lincoln County. We point out that, um, I pointed out that, that, that the question decided in the form or action is the same as the one decided here. We're talking about simply preservation of records versus allowing public officials to destroy those records potentially beginning on September 3rd.

Um, as to point three that the parties are the same, I can tell you I can attest that as you know both cases deal with a public records request, one of which took the avenue of going through the office of hearing examiner with Jessica Pollema being the named party therein. Here we have, We the People for Free, Fair and Transparent Elections, LLC, which, of course, Jessica Pollema, is, and it's on file with the Secretary of State one of the members, up there, there's

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several members, but she's one of the members of that entity as well.

So, we think the parties overlap as well, and that there and again as to .4 res judicata that there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, that was done, we would submit, by stipulation as a part of the first order.

I-I would point out when they say, well, there was no one hearing, it was ex parte, I-I want to make clear so the record is clear that as the court is aware once this-this action, the We The People action was filed, um, on the 31st I believe about noon, shortly thereafter before any appearance had been made, before I knew who-who might appear or who might not appear. The reason I say that is in the other action where the order is applicable, Minnehaha County went and got outside counsel. I didn't know if that would happen here or not, um, but before any of that took place, and I note that Mr. Meader made his notice of appearance I think not until late in the day, I want to say about 5:00 o'clock on September 1st. I simply placed a call to Your Honor and left a message about having another order. It's time sensitive. It would be you know in the same general form as the prior order, um, and wondered if there was anything more we could do in that regard.

As you know, and-and I'm just saying this for the record, I simply showed up the next day. You were in the midst of trial, um, when we caught eyes you indicated, do you

have an order? You-you listened to the voicemail, it made sense and you signed it.

So, I want to make it clear that there wasn't some meeting that we had here that we did, it was simply a-a phone message when there had been no, ah, no one had appeared. They hadn't even been served yet, but-but I was so concerned given that it was August 31st, and we have the holiday coming being very concerned about Friday afternoon before the holiday of whether it would even be possible to get such an order. That's why the phone message and-and thus your order.

As to the, um, ah, the issue again I guess as to due process we think we've-we've established that there was, in fact, um, that was covered. We would submit by, by and through their stipulation, because, Judge, with all due respect to counsel, when-when they initially said we have problems with this order, even with the order being vacated it changed their position not one iota. They're still bound to keep all the records. I, I believe there was some press release. The auditor said, well, now, you know I wasn't planning to get rid of the records. Quite honestly, we think that's true for all of the auditors, um, and that's why this order was not of any monumental significance, um, it was simply making clear, ah, that that would be required.

What I pointed out in my brief that I also want to touch on, if there, if there's some argument about, well, it covers

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future elections that's really a moot point because those are covered under both federal law and state law, but until we get the point of we're at the 21st month many, many, many months from now, your order wouldn't have any different or differing effect I should say in that regard.

So, you know, overall, I guess this-this case is -- hashas always been time sensitive. The court is aware of that. Counsel was aware of that as to the other matter. Again, they are, um, if they're not almost identically the same case they're certainly kissing cousins of cases, and we're not asking of anything to any greater extent here, and-and again Lincoln County is bound by it by the original order. So, their complaints and-and their claim that they have standing as to the wording of the order, um, I-I beg to differ in that respect. And in that regard, again, they've cited no authority in that regard how they have standing in that I did cite the Lippold v. Meade County Board of Commissioners case from 2018. I think it's somewhat analogous, um, in that Supreme Court there specifically dealt with, well, who has the standing to deal with these, um, for lack of a better term sort of jurisdictional issues, and they found there that there wasn't appropriate standing, um, by those folks that had tried to raise the issue about the establishment of the, making Buffalo Chip a city. So, we think that goes here, that Lincoln County can't say, and, by

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the way, I do note in their motion and maybe it's just standard form, but they say that they're appearing here on behalf of the state. They're not. They're here on behalf of Lincoln County. They're not the attorney general's office dealing with maybe a secretary of state issue about these local auditors or these county auditors. And, again, if those county auditors, we've not heard from had any such issue, um, they could certainly appear, and we would deal with it at that time. We think therefore the order was appropriate. should be vacated. It should not have and-and the court's going to do what the court's going to do, um, but we would submit that-that their claim of authority to-to strike that order is not sufficient, and, and I guess I would just say this in the end, we really don't think given that we have these parallel cases of just seeking open records from public officials and-and only asking them not to destroy those records really shouldn't be something that takes, um, you know the proverbial act of Congress to stop from happening, um, and we think the order was appropriate in and of itself especially given the-the court's prior order, and we would ask that, ah, um, that order be reinstated as the court may so chose.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Tornow, and brief reply.

MR. MEADER: Quickly, Judge. I would just state that, once again, I believe Mr. Tornow at one moment says that this doesn't change anything for Lincoln County, but then in the

next sentence says that this was so time sensitive that he wasn't able to talk contact counsel for Lincoln County who he knew to exist from the other case. I believe those two thoughts are competing in ideas, um, that is why statute allows parties certain time to answer a lawsuit, um, because I hadn't filed a notice of appearance yet has no bearing for whether counsel should have been given notice or that a motion should have been drafted to allow parties to appear before Your Honor in an expediated manner.

I would quickly say, also, that, um, once again that the parties in this case are Lincoln County and the plaintiff.

The 65 other auditors are not named in this lawsuit. They were not served. They were not made aware of this lawsuit.

They were not made aware of the possibility of this order until they were faxed it, um, and that's just the simple fact. It's not an issue of standing to argue that. It's jurisdiction. It's something that Your Honor can address himself and that that is an important part of the litigational process that parties are served and given notice. So, I don't believe even if you are, um, convinced by the argument of standing, I believe you can address that on yourself by yourself, Your Honor.

And, finally, I would just state that Mr. Tornow's argument that the preservation of records shouldn't require a motion. I would disagree with that on its base. It is a form

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of a preliminary injunction by telling a party something that they cannot do, ah, when there's other statut--statutory authority otherwise.

Finally, Judge, I would just say that, um, I would agree with Mr. Tornow that these events came to happen rather I don't have the dates in front of me, and I can present that if Your Honor would request a post-motion brief, but I believe within a period of five days the LLC was formed. The complaint was filed. The parties were served, and then this order was signed. I only say that to the effect that the time sensitivity could have been addressed at an earlier time and place, and it was a creation of the plaintiffs themselves by this late creation filing, serving an order, signing, ah, I would also just state that the order, itself, is a mere image of the other litigation except for the simple fact that it changes the parties that are named to the entire State of South Dakota, and I believe that's a material change from the other signed order that should have been made aware to court and counsel. That is a substantive change, and it should have been addressed on the merits.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Meader, and I do appreciate the parties coming early this morning. You know when I first got on the bench I had the opportunity of having my chambers adjacent to, ah, ah, Judge Larry Long, former attorney general and then, of course, our presiding judge, and he smiled at me

one morning when I was going over something similar to a situation that we have right now, and he said, there isn't anything I can't fix without a signature of my pen, and that's exactly what I did in this case, is I went ahead and I signed and I vacated the order that was presented, primarily because of the notice situation, and the claims of no notice.

However, ah, there is presented to the court as the parties talked about this stipulation for order requiring preservation of records, it's in a different file, but yet Lincoln County's listed and in this particular stipulation it does indicate that the parties are agreeing to the entry of an order preserving the machine logs related to not only that, but the cast vote records of the ballots.

And the concern I have is when I read the news is my concern is that are there really CVR's? From what was indicated from our Secretary of State Barnett, ah, do we have CVR's in these cases, and that's the concern I believe when we're talking about that time sensitive nature. I believe the software was billed to the state and the counties as having the CVR functionality, and if it doesn't have that functionality then that creates a problem because we paid for that, and the people of South Dakota should have the right to have that information, if it wasn't provided, then I think there's a reason why we have to have transparency in government.

So, with that being said, and with the situation related to the lack of notice, I do believe that, ah, it's appropriate to go ahead and talk about other situations that, ah, of course, the plaintiff could have come in here. We could be here on a writ of mandamus. We could be a writ of prohibition on destroying the ballots. We could be here on a writ of quo warranto. There are plenty of common law writs that, of course, are binding on officials, ah, and that avenue could have been utilized. Reciprocally, we could have had just a motion to intervene by, of course, ah, I believe, ah, the plaintiff in We the People could have intervened in the matter of the public record request. That intervention also could be allowed.

So, once again, we have multiple different avenues to go ahead and try to get some efficiencies with even what, ah, Mr. Tornow indicated is substantially related litigation, and so I'm going to go ahead and at this point ask the parties to go ahead and to have a conversation on how you want to proceed with a stipulation as to the entry of the order that was done in the other case or I'm going to go ahead and give leave to, of course, ah, have Mr. Tornow file a motion to intervene or take whatever action he wants to go ahead because at this point the parties have already agreed to preserve the records, and so we need to look at some judicial economy as well to go ahead and try to get some efficiencies here because the

parties are substantially the same.

Now, in getting regarding the, ah, ah, the jurisdictional issue related to the other counties. In the other order, I can see that it's binding on Pennington County, Minnehaha County, and Lincoln County, ah, and now, of course, it's been expanded to the rest of the counties that, of course, Mr. Tornow was indicating. At that point, I think that those parties need to be given notice, they need to be served and have an opportunity to appear, but I'm not, ah, going to be expand-expanding it to those other counties. At this point I'm going to limit it just to Lincoln County, but once Mr. Tornow decides on whether he wants to intervene into the other case, ah, that would clearly then potentially involve Pennington and Minnehaha County.

And I might also mention the fact that I don't know where the voting information goes, if it's kept actually at the auditor's office, or if it's transported for calculating purposes to the Secretary of State. I know there's, there's some process involved in that. If the Secretary of State has some of the voting information that, of course, Lincoln County has, and whether it was a federal election it could be triggered and there could be jurisdiction given the fact that there's potential triggering of federal law, but at this particular juncture, I'm going to go ahead and leave that up to Mr. Tornow. You can have a conversation with Mr. Meader or

Mr. Golden, and you guys can figure out how you want to 1 proceed, but at this point I am going to be reinstating that order. I think it's appropriate and given the fact that we've already stipulated to the same in the other case. 5 So, you can decide how you want to proceed with that, Mr. 6 Tornow, so you can prepare an order accordingly. 7 MR. GOLDEN: Your Honor, may we just have one 8 clarification? 9 THE COURT: Sure. 10 MR. GOLDEN: I assume that order excludes all of the other counties? 11 THE COURT: Yes, correct. 12 13 MR. GOLDEN: That are not a party. 14 THE COURT: Correct. MR. GOLDEN: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: Now, but what-what happens in the future if 16 17 Mr. Tornow wants to go ahead and serve the other counties that's -- then we'll be back talking about that later. Okay. 18 All right. Thank you. And, by the way, ah, they could also 19 request a change in venue. I mean we're in a motion practice 20 21 at this point, so, ultimately, I think it's up to them on how 22 they want to proceed. Anything else? 23 MR. TORNOW: Now, thank you, Judge. 24 THE COURT: All right. And I do appreciate you folks 25

being here so early in the morning, but as I indicated I have another hearing that's supposed to start right now. So, I'll let you prepare the order, Mr. Tornow.

MR. TORNOW: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

(No further proceedings were had.)

This is to certify that I, Roxane Osborn, Court
Recorder and Notary Public, do hereby certify and affirm that I
transcribed the proceedings of the foregoing case, and the
foregoing pages 1 - 19, inclusive, are a true and
correct transcription from CourtSmart.

Dated at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, this 11th day of October, 2022.

/s/

Roxane R. Osborn Court Recorder

Notary Public - South Dakota My commission expires: May 9, 2024